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United Kingdom*
I. Recent United Kingdom Tax Developments
A.

PAYMENTS OF INTEREST TO NONRESIDENTS

A new Extra-Statutory Concession was introduced on June 11, 1991. The
concession treats certain payments of interest made by banks and similar institutions to overseas companies as deductions when computing profits, even
though the interest payments would normally be treated as distributions and
would not, therefore, qualify for tax relief. To qualify for this concession the
interest must be payable by a bank (or other company authorized to take deposits
under the Banking Act 1987) in the ordinary course of its business. The concession is restricted to the amount of interest that would have been payable if the
parties to the transaction had been independent parties acting at arm's length.
The Inland Revenue has also extended Extra-Statutory Concession B 13, which
applies where a non-U.K. resident receives untaxed interest that cannot be assessed in the name of a U.K. trustee or a U.K. branch or agent that manages or
controls the interest. The concession has been extended to apply to income from
deep gain securities and to payments relating to deposits held in general client
accounts with building societies. Therefore, no action will be taken to pursue this
income tax liability.
B.

UNILATERAL RELIEF FROM DOUBLE TAXATION

The Inland Revenue issued a Statement of Practice (SP 7/91) on July 26,
1991, concerning unilateral relief from double taxation. The availability of unilateral 'relief for a foreign tax under the terms of the Income and Corporation
Taxes Act 1988, section 790, is determined by examining the tax within its
legislative context in the foreign territory and deciding whether it serves the same
function as income and corporation tax serve in the United Kingdom in relation
to the profits of the business. This new determination policy affects all foreign
taxes levied after February 13, 1991.
C.

ABOLITION OF STAMP DuTY

The introduction of paperless share trading on the London Stock Exchange
(TAURUS), originally scheduled to have started in October 1991, will not now
begin before April 1993. As a result of the delay investors may have to pay £1.2
billion in additional stamp duty, which is due to be abolished when TAURUS
comes into operation. The government may now consider, in the light of the
revised schedule, whether to bring forward the stamp duty and stamp duty
reserve tax abolition dates.
*Prepared by Clifford Chance, London.
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II. Application of EC Law by National Courts
This section outlines recent developments in the case law of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) dealing with the enforcement of rights derived from EC
law in national courts. The cases resulted from references made by national
courts to the ECJ for preliminary rulings.
Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte FactortameLimited and
Others' deals with the enforcement in national law of rights derived from the EEC
Treaty. MarleasingS.A. v. La CommercialInternacionalAlimentaci6n S.A. 2 and
Francovich and Bonifaci v. ItalianRepublic3 concern rights of individuals and
businesses under EC directives that have not been implemented in national law.
A.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE
TO SAFEGUARD

EC LAW

ECJ

RIGHTS IN NATIONAL LAW

Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte FactortameLimited concerned whether a national court must suspend national legislation that may be
incompatible with EC law until a final determination on its compatibility has
been made. The Factortamecase applies existing EC law (that is, the law requiring a provision of EC law to be implemented as effectively as possible) to a
procedural issue, in this case the grant of interim relief. In addition, the case
shows the extent of the Member States' obligation to implement EC law as
effectively as possible, since a national law had to be suspended while it was
determined whether that law was compatible with EC law. The ECJ held that
failure to grant interim relief by suspending the national law in this case would
prevent the most effective application of EC law (because the application of
domestic legislation could prevent the plaintiffs from exercising their EC law
rights until the time when a final determination on the compatibility of the
national law with EC law was made).
B.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE

ECJ

CONCERNING THE DIRECT EFFECT OF DIRECTIVES

EC directives set out objectives that must be implemented in national law
within a specified time limit, although Member States do have discretion in the
way in which these objectives are achieved. Individuals and businesses cannot
generally exercise any rights conferred by EC directives until they have been
implemented in national law. In practice, Member States have often failed to
implement directives. This has caused doubts as to the status of rights conferred
by directives that have not been implemented in national law.
1.
Others,
2.
3.

Case C-213/89, R. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Limited and
3 C.M.L.R. 375 (1990).
Case C-106/89 (not yet published).
Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 (not yet published).
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The seriousness of the failure to safeguard EC law rights (particularly marked
by the failure to implement EC directives in national law) has long been
recognized. Expressions of political intent to improve the situation have been
numerous. In practical terms, however, the case law of the ECJ has had a more
significant impact in giving effect to the rights conferred by EC law. This has
been principally through the doctrine of "direct effect" adopted by the ECJ in
the very early days of the EC and consistently refined since. This doctrine
provides that EC measures may have a direct impact on the relations between
Member States and individuals or businesses without the need for national
measures (vertical direct effect). An EC measure may have direct effect where
it is sufficiently clear and precise and imposes an unconditional obligation on
the Member States that have no real discretion in transposing it into national
law.
MarleasingS.A. v. La CommercialInternationalAlimentaci6n S.A. concerned
the application of a provision of an unimplemented directive between two companies. The ECJ referred to its previous case law that said that an unimplemented
directive cannot be relied upon in actions between private parties (that is, it
cannot have "horizontal direct effect"). However, the ECJ held that the national
court must interpret national law in the light of the words and objectives of the
directive. The ECJ's reasoning was based on the obligation of Member States to
achieve the results set out in directives and to take all appropriate measures to
fulfill their obligations under EC law. This obligation applies to all national
authorities including judicial authorities.
The case is notable for the question mark it raises over the possibility of
allowing horizontal direct effect. The ECJ has clearly stated that directives
cannot have horizontal direct effect. However, it must be questioned whether the
effect of the ECJ's judgment is limited to requiring a national court to interpret
national law in the light of a directive or whether this amounts to requiring an
unimplemented directive to be applied in proceedings between private parties.
Francovichand Bonifaci v. ItalianRepublic concerned the liability in damages
of a Member State for loss caused by its failure to implement a directive. The
ECJ first considered whether the relevant provisions of the directive satisfied the
conditions for producing direct effect and concluded that it did not. Accordingly,
the provisions could not be relied on if they had not been implemented in national
law.
The ECJ then went on to recognize explicitly the principle of Member States'
liability for damages caused to private parties by violations of Community law on
two grounds. First, liability was "inherent in the system of the Treaty." The ECJ
again noted that national courts must apply EC law as effectively as possiblethis would not be the case if private parties were not given the possibility to
obtain damages for losses incurred by breaches of Community law by a Member
State. Second, liability results from the Member States' obligations under article
5 of the EEC Treaty to take all appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of
SUMMER 1992
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obligations under EC law. The ECJ laid down three conditions for the implementation of the Member State liability principle, namely: (1) the result to be
achieved by the directive must include granting rights to private parties; (2) the
extent of these rights must be identified by the provisions of the directive; and
(3) there must be a causal link between the Member State's breach of Community law and the loss suffered by private parties.
The ECJ also discussed the role of national law in exercising the principle of
Member State liability. It said that national law will determine the forum and
procedure for dealing with this issue. National law must not discriminate against
EC law rights by applying less favorable conditions for the exercise of those
rights and that those conditions must not be such as to make it "impossible" or
"excessively difficult" in practice to obtain damages for breaches of EC rights.
C.

CONCLUSION

The ECJ has interpreted the Treaty and measures adopted under it widely to
ensure as far as possible that EC law rights are enforceable before national
courts. Its action to apply EC rights contained in directives can be seen as
frustration at Member States' failure to implement directives in national law. This
frustration is leading to more radical judgments such as those outlined above,
which are based on a broad interpretation of EC law.

III. Arbitration
The ECJ has made an important decision concerning the application of the
1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters 4 (the Convention) to arbitration. The case is of
significance because it affects the jurisdiction of courts in contracting states in
relation to arbitration. Generally, it is presumed that the courts at the place of
arbitration will have jurisdiction in relation to legal proceedings associated with
the arbitration process. Should the Convention apply to such proceedings, a
court at the place of arbitration may have to decline jurisdiction in favor of
another state's courts.
The case of Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Societa ItalianaImpianti PA5 was referred to
the ECJ by the English Court of Appeal for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation
of the exclusion of arbitration from the Convention under article 1.6 For the first
time a United Kingdom court has made a reference to the ECJ on the Convention,

4. 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1 (as revised and updated).
5. Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Societa Italiana Impianti PA, [1991] I.L. Pr. 524.
6. Article 1 of the Convention states: "This Convention shall apply in civil and commercial
matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal ....
The Convention shall not apply to- ... 4.
Arbitration."
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and it is also the first occasion on which the ECJ has been7asked to rule concerning
the scope of the Convention's applicability to arbitration.
The case arose from a contract for sale of a cargo of oil. In January 1987, Marc
Rich & Co. (Marc Rich) telexed Societa Italiana Impianti (SII) offering to purchase a cargo of Iranian crude oil, which offer was accepted subject to certain
further conditions. Marc Rich telexed accepting those further conditions and two
days later telexed once more, this time forwarding the contractual terms, including a law and arbitration clause. This clause nominated English law as the
governing law and stated that any disputes would be referred to a panel of three
arbitrators in London, one each to be chosen by the parties and a third by
agreement between the two arbitrators so chosen. SI made no reply to this last
telex. Marc Rich then proceeded to load the cargo of oil, which was completed
on February 6, 1987. That day, Marc Rich alleged that the oil had been seriously
contaminated, causing a loss in excess of U.S. $7 million.
In February of 1988 SII sought a declaration from a court in Italy that it was
not liable to Marc Rich. Later that month Marc Rich commenced arbitration in
London. When SII did not nominate an arbitrator, Marc Rich applied to the High
Court in London pursuant to the Arbitration Act 1950 for the appointment of an
arbitrator. The High Court granted leave to serve an originating summons on SI
in Italy. SII applied to the High Court for that leave to be set aside. SII argued
that the real dispute was whether the arbitration clause had been incorporated in
the contract. As such, it contended, the matter was covered by the Convention
rules on jurisdiction under which the matter should be heard by the Italian courts.
The judge at first instance held that the Convention did not apply, that the
putative proper law of the contract was English, and that leave to serve on SII in
Italy had been properly granted. SII appealed, and the Court of Appeal referred
the following question to the ECJ: "Does the exception in Article 1(4) of the
Convention extend: (a) to any litigation or judgments and, if so, (b) to litigation
or judgments where the initial existence of an arbitration agreement is in issue?"
The ECJ considered the purpose of the Convention and the report
by Mr.
8
Jenard, prepared in connection with the drafting of the Convention.
The Jenard Report stated that arbitration had been excluded from the Convention because there are already many international agreements on arbitration,
such as the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards. 9 The ECJ stated:
It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground
that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before

7. [1991] I.L. Pr. at 532.
8. Report by Mr. P. Jenard on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 1.
9. Id. at 13.
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national courts. . . . [T]he appointment of an arbitrator by a national court is a measure
adopted by the State as part of the process of setting arbitration proceedings in motion.
Such a measure therefore comes within the sphere of arbitration and is thus covered by
the exclusion contained in Article 1(4) of the Convention. 10
The ECJ then considered whether a preliminary issue as to the existence or
validity of an arbitration agreement would also be excluded from the scope of the
Convention. The ECJ ruled:
In order to determine whether a dispute falls within the scope of the Convention,
reference must be made solely to the subject-matter of the dispute. If, by virtue of its
subject-matter, such as the appointment of an arbitrator, a dispute falls outside the scope
of the Convention, the existence of a preliminary issue which the court must resolve in
order to determine the dispute cannot, whatever that issue may be, justify application
of the Convention."

The ECJ answered the question referred by the English Court (set out above)
as follows: "Article 1(4) of the Convention must be interpreted as meaning that
the exclusion provided for therein extends to litigation pending before a national
court concerning the appointment of an arbitrator, even if the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement is a preliminary issue in that litigation." 12 Thus
the ECJ did not decide whether the issue of the existence or validity of an
arbitration agreement is within the scope of the Convention due to the procedural
analysis of the case before it. The Advocate General, however, had stated in his
very detailed written opinion that, although he did not consider that the ECJ
needed to decide the issue, in his view, "a dispute as to the existence of an
arbitration agreement falls outside the scope of the Convention." ' 3 The Advocate
General argued strongly that the question of the existence or validity of an
arbitration agreement should not be covered by the Convention rules as to jurisdiction in order that such proceedings may be heard before the courts at the
place of the arbitration. However, as contended by SIT, the potential outcome of
this situation is that irreconcilable decisions may arise as between the Member
States-something the Convention aims to prevent.
Hence, until such time as the ECJ is called upon to decide whether, as a main
issue in the proceedings, the question of the existence or validity of an arbitration
agreement is within the scope of the Convention, the matter remains unresolved.
However, the problem may be avoided by framing any such question as a preliminary issue in proceedings clearly involving arbitration and thus outside the
scope of the Convention.

10.
11.
12.
13.

[1991] I.L. Pr. at 559-60.
Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 538.
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